The EU »economic constitution« systematically biases EU policy making in a neo-liberal direction. Historically speaking, this was not the intent of the EU founding fathers. The original constitutional settlement of embedded liberalism was significantly redefined in the next major revisions of the Rome Treaty. The neo-liberal foundations of the single market and the EMU have imposed real and significant institutional constraints for progressive policy making. However, the role of the European Left was crucial in this alteration of the EU constitutional order. Despite the strong neoliberal consensus among the key political actors of that time, such a change would have not be possible without the Left' retreat towards »centreleftism«, particularly in France. Furthermore, while constraints of the EU economic constitution are significant, we should avoid the »naturalization« of the EU project. The European Left, while in power, failed to leave its distinct imprint on the EU economic constitution. The Left policy agenda remained firmly embedded in the logic of the nation state. The euro crisis pushed these developments even further and, for the first time in the EU history, explicitly challenged the constitutional balance of the EU legal order. The new Austerity Union, a project in the making, profoundly altered this constitutional balance.
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II. The European
What these new developments offer is a new perspective on the political economy of the EU integration. If only four decades ago it was still possible to ask whether the Left should be against Europe 5 , today the question has to be reframed: is Europe, its politico-legal framework, working against the Left? Is the European Left confronted with a distinct constitutional order, which, because of its pro-market neoliberal bias, radically limits the ability of the Left to pursue its political programme? As Perry Anderson reminds us, it was Friedrich von Hayek who basically foresaw a development of a constitutional structure of an inter-state federation which would structurally limit the ability of electorates to enact dirigiste and redistributive policies. 6 The major obstacle that such interstate federation would erect against pursuing redistributive polices is the lack of international solidarity required to sustain such policies. 7
When compared with the most recent political developments in the EU,
Hayek's words from 1939 look like a prophecy.
During the last two decades the EU evolved into a new kind of political order making it difficult to pursue a genuine Left political agenda. Namely, the EU entered a new phase of integration which has radically transformed the EU capacity to combine liberalism of common economic market with redistributive social policies either on the national or the EU level. As Höpner and Schäfer argue, the EU has come closer to Hayeks' neoliberal vision of inter-state federation than to the socially embedded liberal economic regime as envisaged by its founding fathers. 8 According to this theory, the law, in the form of the European constitution, determines the politics of the European Union. The European Constitution, a legal superstructure, has, so to speak, a life of its own and crucially determines the base, the relations of production. In other words, the European Left is confronted with a distinct EU constitutional order, which, because of its neoliberal bias, radically limits the importance of the Left's political agenda.
While in broad terms sympathetic to this powerful theory, this article offers an alternative explanation for the fundamental asymmetry between the neoliberal and social agenda in the EU legal order. The crucial reason for the absence of more developed 'social Europe' is not only the structure of the EU constitutional order as such but also the reluctance and inability of the Left to 'Europeanize' its social agenda. 13 The Left thinking and policy proposals concerning 'social Europe' have remained firmly embedded in the logic of the nation state. The Left urgently needs a new post-national approach to 'social Europe'.
In the first four sections of the article I chronicle four different episodes of the institutional settlement between the market and the social in the EU legal order. In the last section I discuss policy alternatives to the current austerity approach to the euro crisis.
II. The European Rescue of the Nation State
The relationship between the European Left and European integration was always a complex one. The European Economic Community (EEC), from its inception, was not a Left project. George Ross argues that the real movers of European integration were Centre-Right Christian Democrats, who were haunted by World War II. 14 The European Left of that era was more focused on national systems of economic and political development and was not very enthusiastic about European integration. However, with the exception of the two largest Communist parties (PCF and PCI), other socialist or socialdemocratic parties in principle did not oppose the project of European integration. 15 As mostly opposition parties, they did not leave their imprint on the construction of an integrated Europe. Their primary concern was to keep the welfare state and its redistributive policies firmly within the jurisdiction of the nation state. As the EEC during the first two decades did not evolve into more than a customs union, the national systems of social protection could expand rapidly. As a consequence, the European »economic constitution« could coexist easily with nationally based systems of social protection and development. While member states could gain from the advantages of the »common market«, at the same time, they were able to continue with the postwar state led development of national welfare states. As argued by Milward, the aim of European integration was to 'rescue the nation state':
The problem genuinely was how to construct a commercial framework which would not endanger the levels of social welfare which had been reached...The
Treaties of Rome had to be also an external buttress to the welfare state. 22 As long as this was possible, the Left did not have strong incentives to challenge the project of European integration. Rather, the Left 'remained by and large a passive bystander, occasionally voicing criticism yet without challenging the project at its core'. 23 that member states faces in the processes of European legislation. While in the past national law had remained in force as long as governments did not agree on a harmonization directive, the new default condition would be mutual recognition«. 35 The paradox is that once the Court of Justice had established basic principles interpreting market freedoms in its own particular way, political bodies of the EU, with their veto position being undermined, had little choice but to follow the court's case law. Subsequently, the ECJ had extended the reach of its early rulings from free trade to free services delivery, free establishment, free capital movement and the free mobility of workers. For Delors, the single market programme was only the first step in a more ambitious programme of integration. He strongly believed that the economic liberalization programme would be followed by both monetary union and MEPs, who opposed the Directive on the grounds that it would undermine the high social standards that apply to most services in many member states. In the long history of social rights the workers and their organisations have been the promoters of their own progress and the more they have succeeded the more they have gained instruments for not just being promoters, but also co-decision makers of the steps forward. They are historically used to playing this role at the national level. For the future they have to get accustomed to play it more and more at the European one. 66
It is surprising how few ideas about alternative 'possible Europes' are being put forward. It seems that one of the major problems of the European Left is the lack of institutional imagination and programmatic thinking which could offer new ideas about alternative, possible Europes. The European Left must start to think how to transcend the 'false necessity' of European neoliberal constitutional order. In order to do that, it must also transcend the nation state approach to social Europe, which unnecessarily limits the range of options available to the European Left to basically two main possibilities: either to a defensive strategy of the re-nationalization of social policy, or to a traditional social-democratic attempt to reconstruct a Keynesian welfare state on the EU level. As Ferrera argues, there is a third option, promising to reconcile the social model centred on the welfare state with the political model centred on the EU model of multi-level governance. The novelty of this approach is in its attempt to strengthen the national welfare state by its more effective and explicit 'nesting' within the overall institutional framework of the EU. 67 As the EU faces its most severe political and economic crisis since its formation, it becomes even clearer that the European left needs to rethink its approach to economic and social regulation at the EU level. With several Treaty amendments and other 'turbo-speed' legislative activities aimed to solve the euro-zone debt crisis, the Right Centre coalition under a strong hegemony of the German Chancellor Merkel has fundamentally transformed the economic constitution . 68 With adoption of the Fiscal Treaty, ESM, European Semester, Euro Plus Pact, Six Pack, this time, the EU risks undermining the 'substantive balance' between the market integration and social policy that sustains the legitimacy of the integration project. 69 While previous Treaty amendments tilted the EU economic constitution strongly into the neo-liberal direction, they nonetheless included legal provisions protecting redistributive autonomy of member states at the national level. This time, the 'Union has been transformed into a political system redistributing significant wealth within its territory'. 70 For the first time in the EU history we see an emergence of a new economic constitution which explicitly entrenches one economic paradigm at the expense of other alternatives, with simultaneously dismantling the remaining protections of social policy autonomy of member states. This approach is not only constitutionally problematic, but also economically questionable. 71 75 Joerges, note 63 supra. 76 Dawson, de Witte, note 64 supra. Other measures such as The Euro-Plus Pact and The European Growth Pact on the other hand explicitly suggest coordination and harmonization of such 77 The Fiscal Treaty requires ratifying member states to enact laws, preferably of a constitutional nature, requiring national budgets to be in balance or in surplus. The treaty defines a balanced budget as one which has a general budget deficit less than 3% of GDP and a structural deficit of less than either 0.5% or 1%, depending on a countries debt-to-GDP ratio. The aim of this "golden rule" of balanced budgets is to ensure budgetary discipline among the EU governments. Another element of the Fiscal compact is so called "debt brake" modeled upon the German constitutional provision requiring the federal government to reduce its structural deficit to 0. avoid some of the past mistakes. Only a concerted, European response of the European Lefts offers a hope that they could reverse the course of European history and make the EU again, as it was in its early days, both the protector and promoter of European nation states. 90
VI. Conclusion: Constitutional limits to Progressive

Politics?
Constitutions in politically liberal nation states usually don't discriminate among different political ideologies. 91 While constitutions impose certain limits on legislative politics, primarily through the protection of constitutional rights, it can hardly be argued that, on balance, they privilege one or another political ideology. The EU 'economic constitution' is, in this respect, different.
It systematically biases EU policy making in a neo-liberal direction. Furthermore, while constrains of the EU economic constitution are significant, 90 Milward, note 16 supra. 91 For persuasive argument that many constitutions in Latin America do favour certain political ideologies, such as social democracy or neo-liberalism, see D.Brinks, W.Forbath, 'The role of courts and constitutions in the new politics of welfare in Latin America', unpublished paper, 2013.
we should avoid the 'naturalization' of the EU, 'depicting it as an automatic upshot of a wholly impersonal logic'. 92 As Rosemond argues, such view downplays the contingency of such logic . 93 The European Left, while in power, failed to leave its distinct imprint on the EU economic constitution.
Despite certain quite important achievements (Employment Chapter, Social
Chapter, equal protection, environment, health and safety), the Left failed to promote a coherent EU approach to 'social Europe'. The Left policy agenda remained firmly embedded in the logic of the nation state. The euro crisis pushed these developments even further and, for the first time in the EU history, explicitly challenged the constitutional balance of the EU legal order.
The new Austerity Union, a project in the making, profoundly altered this constitutional balance. The new politics of austerity is both politically and economically flawed. It threatens the very foundations of European integration. The euro crisis thus represents both a challenge and opportunity for the Left to offer an alternative response to the biggest EU crisis since its inception. But in order to succeed, the European Left must first reform itself.
The PES Manifesto is a promising sign in that direction. 
